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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this Petition for Review 
of the final decision of the Utah State Tax Commission (the 
"Commission") is Uta^ t Code Annotated §§63-46-14 and 78-2-2 (e) (ii) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case1: 
1. Whether, absent the intent to establish a new 
domicile, temporary residence away from an established domicile for 
a mere temporary or special purpose, even for a period of years, 
results in the abandonment of the original domicile, 
2. If so, whether the party alleging the abandonment of 
the original domicile has the burden of proof to establish at what 
point the original domicile is abandoned and the new domicile is 
established. 
3. Whether the Commission erred in not addressing the 
residency status of Appellants James O'Rourke and Beverly O'Rourke 
(the "O'Rourkes") on a year-by-year, or period-by-period, basis. 
4. In light of the unrebutted evidence produced at the 
formal hearing before the Commission held on January 14, 1991 (the 
1In order to simplify the organization of the Argument section 
in light of the number of issues presented for review, not all of 
the issues will be addressed in separate argument sections. 
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"Hearing") establishing that Mr, O'Rourke was not present within 
Utah more than 125 days during any year in question, whether the 
Commission offered sufficient evidence to carry its burden to show 
that Mr. O'Rourke abandoned his established domicile in Florida and 
established a new domicile in Utah and, if so, at what point Mr. 
O'Rourke abandoned his domicile in Florida. 
5. Whether"a wife's and/or children's physical presence 
in a particular place determines a husband's domicile if the 
husband has no intention of making that place his permanent or 
indefinite home. 
6. Whether the sale of a place of abode in an established 
domicile and the acquisition of a place of abode in another place, 
without the intention of remaining in the location of the new place 
of abode either permanently or indefinitely, results in the 
abandonment of the established domicile. 
7. Whether the Commission's decision assessing taxes 
against the O'Rourkes as to all the audit periods in question is 
supported by substantial evidence based on the whole record. 
8. Whether the Commission is precluded, as a result of 
the actions of its representatives, from claiming the O'Rourkes 
were residents of Utah for income tax purposes for some or all of 
the periods in question because of the doctrines of waiver and/or 
estoppel. 
9. If the Commission is not precluded from claiming the 
O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for all of the periods in 
2 
question, whether the Commission has the burden of proof to show 
that there was a fundamental change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances 
during the periods in which the Commission is not precluded from 
claiming the O'Rourkes were Utah residents. 
10. Whether the Commission's failure to address the waiver 
and/or estoppel issue in its final decision constitutes error. 
The applicable standards of review for the issues stated 
above are as follows: 
(a) For a review of the Commission's interpretations of 
general questions of law, the applicable standard of review is the 
"correction of error" standard. Under this standard, this Court 
should review the Commission's rulings for correctness, but accord 
no deference to the expertise of the Commission. Utah Dept. of 
Admin. Serv. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n.. 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983); 
(b) The applicable standard of review for issues of fact 
is the "substantial evidence11 or "whole record" test, under which 
this Court must consider not only the evidence supporting the 
Commission's factual findings, but also the evidence that fairly 
detracts from the weight of the Commission's evidence. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); 
and 
(c) The applicable standard of review for questions of 
mixed law and fact is the "reasonableness or rationality" test, 
under which the Commission's decisions must fall within the limits 
of reasonableness or rationality. Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. 
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Pub. Serv. Com'n., 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). See also. Hurley v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Com;n., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is believe to 
be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. Many 
provisions of the Utah Code and the Rules and Regulations of the 
Commission are, however, relevant to the disposition of this 
Petition for Review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition by the Commission. This is a petition for review of a 
final decision made by the Commission with respect to the 
O'Rourkes' residency status for Utah state income tax purposes 
during the audit periods 1983 through 1988. In January and 
February of 1990, the Commission determined that the O'Rourkes were 
required, but had failed, to file Utah income tax returns for the 
years 1983 through 1988, and sent Notices of Estimated Income Tax 
Returns, assessing unpaid Utah income taxes, penalties and interest 
to the O'Rourkes totalling $24,300.89, as follows: $2,450.16 in 
taxes, penalties and interest for 1983; $1,937.03 in taxes and 
interest for 1984; $5,622.42 in taxes, penalties and interest for 
1985; $4,727.78 in taxes, penalties and interest for 1986; 
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$5,307.03 in taxes, penalties and interest for 1987; and $4,256.47 
in taxes, penalties and inteirest for 1988. 
The O'Rourkes filed a timely Petition for Redetermination 
and Notice in letter form, which the Commission answered on or 
about February 5, 1990. On March 6, 1990, the O'Rourkes filed a 
Reply to the Commission's Answer To Petition for Redetermination 
and Notice, and a formal hearing (the "Hearing") was held on the 
matter on January 14, 1991, before Paul Iwasaki, a Hearing Officer 
for the Commission. At the Hearing, the sole issue was whether the 
O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for income tax purposes under Utah 
Code Annotated §59-10-103(1)(j)(i). 
On April 2, 1991, the Commission issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision (the "Final Decision"), 
finding that, for all periods in question, the O'Rourkes were 
residents of Utah for income tax purposes. On May 2, 1991, the 
O'Rourkes filed a Notice of Petition For Review with this court 
requesting a review of the Final Decision. 
2. Statement of Facts. The basic facts of this case are 
largely undisputed. During the periods in question, Mr. O'Rourke 
was a commercial airline pilot who flew extensively throughout the 
United States and who was only infrequently in Utah. Mrs. O'Rourke 
was a housewife. In the early 1980's, after residing for several 
years in the Miami, Florida area, the O'Rourkes decided to move to 
central Florida and purchased some property in that area on which 
to build a home. Due to a number of unforeseen financial problems, 
5 
they were not able to begin construction of their home on their 
property. Since they felt it was important for their children to 
move from the Miami area, they decided to temporarily settle in 
Salt Lake City, The unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke is that 
the O'Rourkes always intended to return to Florida once their 
Florida home was completed; however, they were repeatedly forced to 
delay their return because of unforeseen financial setbacks. 
(a) The Years Before the O'Rourkes Came to Utah. 
Prior to their move to Utah, the O'Rourkes lived in Florida, 
primarily in the Miami area, and always considered it to be their 
home (Transcript of the Hearing ("Tr.") at 9-11; Exhibit ("Ex.") P-
17 at Response Nos. 7 and 26) . In 1966, Mr. O'Rourke was employed 
by Eastern Airlines, and in 1980 was promoted to the position of 
captain. (Tr. at 12) To qualify for the promotion, however, he 
was required to change his base of operations2 from Miami to New 
York City. (Tr. at 12, 76) . Since pilots are generally allowed to 
fly as regular passengers anywhere on their airline flight system 
for little or no charge, Mr. O'Rourke could "commute" to his new 
base of operations in New York from his home in Florida, and did 
not have to move his family from their home in Miami. (Tr. at 13) . 
z
 A pilot's base of operations determines the beginning and 
ending place of each flight sequence he flies. Each sequence may 
involve flights to several cities, but each sequence is designed so 
that the pilot begins and ends the sequence in the same city, the 
pilot's base of operations. (Tr. at 93-95). Airline pilots 
frequently maintain bases of operation which are different from the 
places their families reside. (Tr. at 13). 
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In 1980, as a result of dramatic increases in crime, drugs 
and gang warfare in Miami, the O'Rourkes decided to move to central 
Florida. (Tr. at 14-15; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). Since they 
intended to move to a location which was close enough to an airport 
on the Eastern Airlines system that Mr. O'Rourke could commute to 
his base of operations in New York City, the move would not 
adversely affect his employment. (Tr. at 13; Ex. P-17 at Response 
No. 3) . 
(1) The Purchatse of the Eustis Property. In mid-
January, 1981, after an extensive property search, the O'Rourkes 
acquired 32 acres of property near the city of Eustis, Florida. 
Approximately 28 acres of the property contained mature orange 
groves. (Tr. at 15; P-17 at Response No. 3) . The O'Rourkes 
intended to make substantial improvements to the property, 
including a home, a roadway, a combination barn/garage/storage 
shed, and an irrigation system for the orange trees. (Tr. at 18) . 
They completed initial sketches, layout plans and architectural 
drawings for these improvements in late 1981 (Ex. P-17 at Response 
Nos. 11 and 12) . The O'Rourkes planned to pay for the construction 
of the improvements with the proceeds of the orange grove's 
production, which they believed would net them approximately $1,000 
per acre of orange grove per year. (Tr. at 19; Ex. P-17 at 
Response No. 3) . 
In early 1981, Mr. O'Rourke's parents, who also lived in 
Miami, also began making plans to move to central Florida. (Tr. at 
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19) . To assist them in their move, the O'Rourkes acquired another 
7.5 acres of property (including 4 acres of mature orange grove) 
adjacent to the 32 acres they already owned in Eustis. The 
O'Rourkes promised to build a home for their parents on this 
property. (Tr. at 19-20, 64; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3 and 9). 
(2) The Destruction of the 1981 Orange Crop and the 
Marginal 1982 Orange Crop. One week after the O'Rourkes bought the 
Eustis property, a "ten-year freeze" occurred, destroying their 
orange crop completely and causing damage to several acres of their 
trees. (Tr. at 20, 65) . As a result, the O'Rourkes lost all 
revenue from the 1981 orange crop, which was to be used to begin 
construction of their home. (Tr. at 21). In addition, they were 
required to spend another approximately $30,000 in 1981 for extra 
pruning, fertilizing and agricultural care for the groves. (Tr. at 
20-21; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). At the same time, they were 
required to make principal payments on the Eustis property in the 
approximate amount of $12,000, and continued to maintain their home 
in Miami (Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). 
During the 19 82 crop growing season, the orange groves 
were recovering from the 1981 freeze and produced no marketable 
fruit. That year the O'Rourkes experienced another out-of-pocket 
loss of approximately $18,000 for the care of their groves, made 
another $12,000 principal payment on the purchase price of the 
Eustis property and, in addition, continued to maintain their home 
in Miami. (Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3). 
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By mid-1982, the O'Rourkes realized they could not afford 
to begin construction on their Eustis home. Nevertheless, because 
they still felt they needed to move out of the Miami area, they 
decided to temporarily move to another location in central Florida 
until they could build their Eustis home. (Tr. at 21-22; Ex, P-17 
at Response No. 3). They spent approximately seven weeks looking 
for a suitable temporary location near the Eustis property, and 
physically inspected about 15 properties in the area, all of which 
had been pre-screened by their realtor. (Tr. at 22-23; Ex P-17 at 
Response No. 21) . The O'Rourkes also inspected properties in 
several nearby towns. In each case, the properties they inspected 
were either too expensive or included too much property. (Tr. at 
22-23; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 21; Ex. P-l). 
After reviewing their options, the O'Rourkes decided to 
relocate temporarily to the western United States until they could 
build their home on the Eustis property. Their selection criteria 
for the temporary location required a city with cultural 
opportunities, without big city problems, a reasonable weather 
pattern, educational and recreational opportunities and, most 
importantly, a city which was on the Eastern Airlines route system 
so Mr. O'Rourke could continue commuting to his base of operations. 
(Tr. at 23; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3 and 21). Overall, the 
O'Rourkes believed that Salt Lake City's lower cost of living and 
housing made it the best choice. In addition, Mr. O'Rourke had a 
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brother that he had not been close to in several years who lived in 
Salt Lake City. (Tr. at 24; Ex. P-17 at Responses 3 and 21). 
(b) The O'Rourkes' Relocation to Utah. In 1982, the 
O'Rourkes sold their home in Miami and purchased a house in Olympus 
Cove, a subdivision of Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Olympus house"). 
(Tr. at 25; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9). The O'Rourkes purchased 
the Olympus house for several reasons, but primarily (i) because 
they needed to rollover the gains from the sale of their Miami 
home, (ii) buying a house conferred greater tax advantages than 
renting a house would, and (iii) Salt Lake City was experiencing a 
real estate "boom" and they believed that they could sell the 
Olympus house with minimal improvements for a substantial profit, 
which could then be used toward the completion of their Florida 
home. (Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9). Significantly, 
at the time the O'Rourkes acquired the Olympus house and at all 
times subsequent thereto, they intended to be in Utah only 
temporarily and always had the present intention of returning to 
Florida permanently. (Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 
3, 5 and 6). 
(1) Mr. O'Rourke's Parents' Unexpected Move to Utah. 
About the time the O'Rourkes bought the Olympus house, 
Mr. O'Rourke's parents, who then still lived in Miami, decided to 
move to Salt Lake City and occupy the home of Mr. O'Rourke's 
brother, who had moved to Boston for two years as part of a 
teaching assignment. When the parents moved into the house, the 
10 
O'Rourkes made a commitment to them that they would build a home 
for them on the Eustis property before the brother's teaching 
contract expired in late 1984. (Tr. at 27-28; Ex. P-17 at Response 
No. 9) . 
Approximately five months after moving to Boston, however, 
Mr. O'Rourke's brother unexpectedly returned to Salt Lake City. 
(Tr. at 28; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9). Since Mr. O'Rourke's 
parents had already sold their Miami home, had nowhere to live, no 
income except Social Security, and no life savings except the small 
sales proceeds from their home, the O'Rourkes felt obligated to 
help them buy a house in Salt Lake City. (Tr. at 20; Ex. P-17, at 
Response No. 9) . Therefore, they refinanced the Olympus house and 
purchased a small house in Sandy, Utah (the "Sandy house") for 
$50,000.3 The down-payment for the Sandy house was $10,000, with 
a 30 year mortgage for the balance. (Tr. at 29; Ex. P-17 Response 
No. 17). The costs of refinancing the Olympus house and carrying 
the monthly payments on the Sandy house increased the O'Rourkes' 
monthly mortgage obligations from approximately $900 per month to 
approximately $1650 per month. (Tr. at 29, 69). 
3
 In order to comply with Federal Housing Administration 
Regulations regarding the financing for the Sandy house, 
Mr. O'Rourke's parents' names were placed on the title. The 
O'Rourkes and their parents agreed that the O'Rourkes would pay the 
monthly payments on the Sandy house in return for the parents' 
agreement to provide the labor component of any improvements to be 
made to it. (Tr. at 31, 69) . 
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(2) Destruction of the 1983 Orange Crop and, in 1984, 
the Groves. During this time, the Eustis property continued to be 
a financial burden. In 1983, another "ten-year freeze" killed 
approximately one-third of the orange trees and, for the third 
straight year, all of the crop. (Tr. at 30; Ex. P-17 at Response 
No. 9) . Although the O'Rourkes had anticipated when they bought 
the Eustis property in 1981 that by the end of 1983 they would net 
approximately $70,000 from the sales of their orange crops that 
they could apply toward the construction of a home, because of the 
damage to the crops and trees from the freezes they had no income 
from the orange groves and, instead, spent an unanticipated $65,000 
to repair the freeze damage. During this period, the O'Rourkes 
also spent several thousand dollars on the Olympus house to improve 
its chances for resale. (Tr. at 31-33, Ex. P-17 at Response No. 
9) . 
In 1984, several events occurred which caused the 
O'Rourkes to realize that they would have to further delay 
construction of their Florida home. First, the Salt Lake City real 
estate market entered a decline, so the O'Rourkes could not sell 
the Olympus house. (Tr. at 34). In addition, central Florida 
experienced a "one hundred-year freeze", which destroyed the entire 
orange crop and killed all of the trees on the Eustis property. 
(Tr. at 33) . To ease their financial situation, the O'Rourkes sold 
approximately 10 acres of the Eustis property to a third party. 
They used the proceeds of the sale to pay off the mortgage on the 
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remainder of the Eustis property and to make improvements to the 
Olympus house to make it more saleable. (Tr. at 34-36; Ex. 3) . In 
1985, the O'Rourkes cleared all dead trees from the property, 
spending several thousand dollars in the process. (Tr. at 36). 
(3) Financial Concerns at Work and the Purchase of the 
Residence in Lutz. Florida. In 1986, changes at Mr. O'Rourke's 
employer, Eastern Airlines, further complicated the O'Rourkes1 
strained financial situation. At that time, Frank Lorenzo and his 
affiliates gained control of the company. Mr. Lorenzo had 
previously gained control of Continental Airlines and, shortly 
after doing so, had substantially reduced its employees' 
compensation and tied up their retirement funds in protracted 
litigation. Mr. O'Rourke believed Mr. Lorenzo would implement 
similar management strategies at Eastern.4 (Tr. at 37) . 
In light of the problems at Eastern Airlines and the 
substantial costs of holding the Eustis property, the O'Rourkes 
eventually decided to sell it and acquire other property in central 
Florida with a home already on it. (Tr. at 37-38) . Unfortunately, 
because the "one-hundred year freeze" killed all the trees on the 
Eustis property, its value had substantially declined. (Tr. at 
4
 Indeed, after Mr. Lorenzo obtained control of Eastern 
Airlines, he immediately instituted programs to improve the 
company's cash flow position. These programs included investment 
programs under which Eastern's employees were required to purchase 
the company's securities, which are now virtually worthless. These 
purchase programs resulted in an immediate 20% reduction in Mr. 
O'Rourke's gross income. (Tr. at 77). 
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37) . The O'Rourkes eventually sold the Eustis property in 1987 for 
a substantial loss. (Tr. at 38-39, 45-46; Ex. P-4) . 
During the O'Rourkes' search for new property in the 
Eustis area, Mr. O'Rourke's parents decided to move back to 
Florida. (Tr. at 47-48; Ex. P-17 at Response 9). The O'Rourkes 
eventually arranged for the purchase of a home in Lutz, Florida 
(the "Lutz home"), a city approximately 90 miles from Eustis, 
Florida. (Tr. at 48-49; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 9 and 13). They 
were unable to return to Florida and occupy the Lutz home, however, 
because it needed substantial improvements, because they could not 
dispose of their real property in Utah, and, based in part on their 
unfulfilled promise to Mr. O'Rourke's parents that they would build 
a home for them on the Eustis property, because Mr. O'Rourke's 
parents moved into the Lutz home. The Lutz home is a "fixer upper" 
and Mr. O'Rourke's parents agreed to make improvements to the home 
pending the O'Rourkes' return to Florida (Tr. at 48-49, 75, Ex. p. 
17 at Response No. 13). 
Because of Mr. O'Rourke's continuing concerns about the 
financial stability of Eastern Airlines, particularly the security 
of its retirement funds, he retired in November of 1988. (Tr. at 
50, 74). After retiring, he spent the majority of his time making 
improvements to the Olympus and Sandy houses. The O'Rourkes 
believed that these improvements were necessary if the houses were 
to sell. This belief was based on the recommendations of their 
realtor, who advised them that without substantial improvements, 
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particularly to the Olympus house, they should not place them on 
the market. (Tr. at 51, 71) . Upon completing the improvements to 
the houses, the O'Rourkes placed them on the market. The Olympus 
house sold in June of 1989, and the Sandy house eventually sold in 
June of 1990. The O'Rourkes sold the Olympus house, which they 
acquired for $125,000, for $139,000, but only after making 
approximately $35,000"in improvements. Similarly, the Sandy home, 
which the O'Rourkes acquired for $50,000, was sold for $59,000, but 
only after the O'Rourkes made approximately $17,000 in improvements 
to it. (Tr. at 50-53, 67, 71-75). 
(c) Mr. O'Rourke's Contacts With Utah. During all of 
the periods in question, Mr. O'Rourke had only minimal contacts 
with Utah. During his employment with Eastern Airlines, and as 
required by federal law, Mr. O'Rourke maintained a detailed log 
regarding his flight activities. This log contains the date, 
duration, take-off time, landing time, beginning point and 
destination point for each of his flights. (Tr. at 54-56; Exs. P-
12, P-13 and P-14). Based on information contained in this flight 
log, each pilot is required by law to be able to immediately 
ascertain whether he is able, based on a complex set of federal 
regulations, to fly any flight for which he is scheduled. (Tr. at 
54-56, 98). 
Based on information contained in these log books, 
MR. O'ROURKE WAS OUTSIDE UTAH AN AVERAGE OF 253 DAYS DURING EACH OF 
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THE YEARS IN QUESTION.5 The log books show that Mr. O'Rourke was 
within the State of Utah only approximately 116 days of 1983, 82 
days in 1984, 118 days in 1985, 120 days in 1986, 105 days in 1987, 
and 125 days in 1988. (Tr. at 56; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 9; Exs. 
P-12, P-13 and P-14) . These log books also established that, 
during the entire period in question, Mr. O'Rourke flew into or out 
of the Salt Lake International Airport as a member of a scheduled 
flight crew only approximately a dozen times. (Tr. at 96, 102). 
Even on those occasions, he generally stayed with his flight crew 
in a hotel near the airport and did not stay with his family. (Tr. 
at 102) . 
(d) The O'Rourkes' Continuing Contacts With Florida. 
During the periods in question, the O'Rourkes maintained very close 
ties with Florida. For example, during all the periods in 
question, and for a number of years prior thereto, the O'Rourkes' 
primary banking account was maintained at the Eastern Airlines 
Employee Credit Union in Miami, Florida (the "Florida Account"). 
(Tr. at 57-58; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 20). Mr. O'Rourke's 
paycheck was deposited into the Florida Account by direct deposit. 
(Tr. at 58) . Although the O'Rourkes also maintained auxiliary, 
local banking accounts, those accounts were funded by transfers 
from the Florida Account. The amounts transferred from the local 
5The Commission has waived any claim that Mr. O'Rourke was a 
resident of Utah for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-10-103(1) (j) (ii) . (Tr. at 116). 
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accounts generally were sufficient only to pay the monthly expenses 
of Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke children in Utah. (Tr. at 58, 
79; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 20). Mr. O'Rourke also maintained a 
Florida driver's license during all the periods in question, 
belonged to sporting clubs in Florida, maintained voter 
registration in Florida and registered the automobile that he used 
at his base of operations in Florida. (Tr. at 57-59, 80; Ex. P-17 
at Response Nos. 14, 17, 18 and 19; Ex. P-15). 
Further, during the periods in question, the O'Rourkes 
spent considerable time in Florida. They averaged at least three 
trips there each year for week-long fishing trips, traveled there 
on several occasions for parties with friends, traveled there 
several times on holidays for approximately one week at a time and 
spent at least two weeks there during most summers for vacations. 
In addition, Mr. O'Rourke went to Florida for the specific purpose 
of visiting the Eustis Property approximately 16 times during the 
periods in question, and also visited the Eustis property 
approximately ten more times when he visited friends in the Eustis 
area. Mr. O'Rourke also went to the Tampa area to look for housing 
approximately eight times in 1987 prior to the purchase of the Lutz 
Home, and visited with his sister in Miami approximately 25 times 
during the periods in question. (Tr. at 59, 102; Ex. P-17 at 
Response No. 24) . The O'Rourkes also paid substantial taxes to 
Florida. For example, during the periods in question, they paid 
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$3,662 to Dade County, $3,046 to Lake County, and $358 to Pascoe 
County, Florida.6 (Ex. P-17 at Response No. 16) . 
Finally, although Mrs. O'Rourke engaged in some activities 
in Utah arguably associated with the establishment of a domicile, 
she did so only because she was required to do so by law and not 
with the intent to move the O'Rourkes' affairs to Utah. For 
example, Mrs. O'Rourke obtained a Utah driver's license in 1982, 
but did so only because she understood that, as a driver of an 
automobile in Utah on more than on an infrequent basis, she needed 
to obtain a Utah driver's license. (Tr. at 85, 59; Ex. P-17 at 
Response No. 18) . Similarly, although the O'Rourkes owned 
automobiles which they registered in Utah, the vehicles were 
registered here only because of their understanding that vehicles 
used on the state's highways other than on an infrequent basis are 
required to be registered in the state. (Tr. at 80-81; Ex. P-17 at 
Response No. 17) . The automobiles were registered in Mr. 
O'Rourke's name because of insurance reasons. (Tr. at 101). 
(e) The Commission's Prior Determination Regarding the 
O'Rourkes' Residency Status. In September of 19 88, the O'Rourkes 
received a letter from Mr. Robert N. Laird, an income tax auditor 
with the Commission, regarding a proposed state income tax 
assessment for 1984. (Tr. at 60; Ex. P-16) . Shortly after 
receiving the letter, Mr. O'Rourke met with Mr. Laird in the 
6Florida does not have an income tax on individuals, only 
corporations. See, Florida Statutes § 220, et seq. (1989). 
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Commission's offices with Mr. Laird. At Mr. Laird's request, 
Mr. O'Rourke provided the Commission with evidence showing that the 
O'Rourkes were residents of Florida. (Tr. at 60, 61). 
After reviewing that evidence, Mr. Laird wrote the 
initials "N/A" for "Not Applicable" in the upper right-hand corner 
of the letter, and informed Mr. O'Rourke that, based on his review 
of the facts, the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah. Mr. Laird 
further informed Mr. O'Rourke that, if the O'Rourkes received 
letters from the Commission regarding their residency status for 
other years, they should contact him and that he would make sure 
that the problem was resolved in their favor. (Tr. at 60-61; Ex. 
P-16) . 
Mr. Laird's determination in the case was subsequently 
reviewed by Mr. Brent Barney, the Income Tax Audit Manager for the 
Auditing Division of the Commission. (Tr. at 110). Mr. Barney did 
not reprimand or admonish Mr. Laird regarding his disposition of 
the O'Rourkes' case, nor did he, in any way, question the 
conclusion that Mr. Laird reached in the matter. (Tr. at 110). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In its Final Decision, the Commission held that the 
O'Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their domicile in Florida as a 
result of their extended absence from that state and because the 
O'Rourkes' intent to return to Florida constituted only a hope of 
some future expectation. However, temporary residence outside of 
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a domicile, even for an extended period of years, does not result 
in an abandonment of the original domicile, as long as there is an 
absence of any present intention of residing in the newly alleged 
domicile permanently or indefinitely. Further, as long as the 
O'Rourkes' intention to return to Florida was based upon the 
occurrence of an event which could be reasonably anticipated to 
occur, that intent cannot be deemed to be an "indeterminate-11 or 
"floating intent" requiring a finding that they abandoned their 
domicile in Florida. Accordingly, the Commission's holding must be 
reversed. 
2. The Commission had the burden of production to show 
that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in Florida, and was 
required to show that the O'Rourkes did so by clear and convincing 
evidence. The Commission produced no such evidence at the Hearing, 
and so the Commission's decision that the O'Rourkes abandon their 
domicile in Florida cannot be sustained. 
3. The Commission's decision is based in part on a 
determination that the O'Rourkes were domiciled in Utah because 
Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke children were present in the state. 
Since a wife's domicile is determined by the domicile of her 
husband as a matter of law and a husband's domicile is where his 
family resides only if he intends that place to be the permanent or 
indefinite residence of the family, the Commission's determination 
was in error. Moreover, even if Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke 
children were residents of Utah during the periods in question, 
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that does not preclude the fact that Mr. O'Rourke was domiciled in 
Florida, since a husband and wife may have separate domiciles and 
may be residents of different states for tax purposes. 
4. In reviewing the decisions of the Commission, this 
Court must consider and review the whole record before it and 
consider not only the evidence supporting the Commission's 
findings, but also the evidence that detracts from the weight of 
the Commission's evidence. Under this standard, there is no doubt 
that the Commission's findings were not supported by substantial 
evidence based on the whole record, and those findings must be 
reversed. 
5. At the Hearing, and in its post-hearing brief, the 
O'Rourkes argued that the Commission is precluded from assessing 
taxes against them for the periods in question as a result of the 
Commission's actions in September of 1988, when it determined that 
the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah for tax purposes. This 
issue, however, was not even addressed by the Commission in its 
Final Decision. Since the import of the Commission's actions in 
1988 was a material issue which, if held in the O'Rourkes' favor, 
would preclude the Commission from assessing taxes against the 
O'Rourkes for some or all of the periods in question, the 
Commission's failure to make any findings with respect to that 
issue was reversible error. 
6. In September of 1988, the Commission, after due 
investigation, determined that the O'Rourkes were not residents of 
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Utah for the year 1984. The Commission should be bound by this 
determination. In addition, because the Commission had notice and 
knowledge of the O'Rourkes' filing status for all of the years 19 82 
through 1987 at the time of that determination, the Commission's 
conclusion that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 19 84 is 
evidence that the Commission waived assessment of taxes against the 
O'Rourkes for any subsequent periods. Even assuming the Commission 
waived action only with respect to 1984, its determination in 1988 
that the O'Rourkes were not residents in 19 84 necessarily precludes 
it from finding they were residents of Utah for tax purposes in any 
other year, unless it was able to show that there was a fundamental 
change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances which would require that 
their nonresident status be changed. Finally, because the 
O'Rourkes reasonably relied to their detriment on the Commission's 
statements regarding their residency status, the Commission should 
be precluded from assessing penalties or interest for the periods 
in question even if the O'Rourkes are held to be residents for tax 
purposes during those periods. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE O'ROURKES 
WERE DOMICILED IN UTAH DURING THE PERIODS IN QUESTION 
A. The Commission Erred in Determining That The O'Rourkes 
Abandoned Their Domicile in Florida. In its Final Decision, the 
Commission held that the O'Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their 
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domicile in Florida as a result of their extended absence from the 
state and because their intention to return there constituted 
"nothing more than mere hopes of some future expectation, the date 
and occurrence of which was unknown," Final Decision at 7. This 
conclusion, however, is based upon a misapprehension of black 
letter domicile law, and should be reversed as a matter of law. 
Since at least as early as 1875, courts have uniformly 
held that a person does not abandon his established domicile, even 
if he is absent from it for a period of years, if there is no 
intent to stay in the new locality. One of the first, and perhaps 
most succinct, discussions of this principle was given by the 
United States Supreme Court in the case of Mitchell v. United 
States. 88 U.S. 350 (1875), where the Court stated that: 
A domicil once acquired is presumed to continue 
until it is shown to have been changed . . . . 
If a change of domicil is alleged, the burden of 
proving it rests upon the person making the 
allegation . . . . To constitute a new domicil, 
two things are indispensable: First, residence 
in the new locality; and second, the intention 
to remain there . . . . Mere absence from a 
fixed home, however long continued, cannot work 
the change. There must be animus to change the 
prior domicil for another. Until the new is 
acquired, the old one remains . . . . These 
principles are axiomatic in the law upon the 
subject. 
Since that time, every court which has addressed the issue 
has followed the holding reach in Mitchell. See, e.g.. Messersmith 
v. Matteucci. 276 F.Supp. 310, 312 (E.D. Ca. 1966) aff 'd per curium 
385 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1967) (quoting Mitchell) . See also. 
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Petition of Oaanesoff. 20 F.2d 978 (D.C. S.D. Cal. 1927) 
(established domicile not lost by temporary residence elsewhere, 
even for a period of years), People v. Chrysler, 265 P. 92 (Colo. 
1928) (citing Jain v. Bossen, 62 P. 194 (Colo. 1900), for the 
proposition that temporary residence outside of domicile, even for 
an extended period of several years, does not affect original 
domicile); Rhoades v. Rhoades, 182 P.2d 275 (Cal. 1947}- (no 
abandonment of original domicile even after extensive residence 
elsewhere) ; Utah Tax Commission Rule R865-9-2I ("domicile" does not 
include habitation in a particular place for a mere special or 
temporary purpose). 
The principles enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Mitchell were later followed in Coca Cola International 
Corp. v. New York Trust Company, 8 A.2d 511 (Del. 1939), rev'd sub 
nom New York Trust Company v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772 (Del. 1940) 
(hereinafter "Riley"), a case upon which the Commission relied in 
pleadings filed earlier in this action. See Answer to Petition For 
Redetermination and Notice, at p. 2. In Riley, the Coca Cola 
Company brought an interpleader action in Delaware against an 
estate's New York administrator to determine whether stock 
certificates should be issued to the estate's Georgia executor or 
to its New York administrator. The resolution of the issue 
depended upon whether the deceased, Mrs. Hungerford, was legally 
domiciled in Georgia or New York at her death. 
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Mrs. Hungerford was a resident of Atlanta, Georgia, who 
married Mr. Hungerford, a resident of New York City, in 1932. 
Between the time of the Hungerfords' marriage and Mrs. Hungerford's 
death in 1935, the couple spent almost all of their time in 
Atlanta, Georgia. The couple returned to New York only 
infrequently and for short periods of time, generally staying at 
hotels and registering as residents of Atlanta. Neither of the 
Hungerfords owned any real property in New York, but 
Mrs. Hungerford owned an elaborate home in Atlanta. The couple 
made extensive improvements to this home, and had made plans for 
even grander improvements before Mrs. Hungerford died. While the 
couple was in Georgia, Mr. Hungerford joined several country clubs 
in the Atlanta area, used the Atlanta home as his address, and 
changed his New York club memberships to nonresident status. The 
Hungerfords also filed federal and state income taxes from Atlanta, 
prepared and executed wills in the state, registered and drove cars 
there and showed Georgia as their home on their stationery and 
various business correspondence. 
Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that 
Mr. Hungerford had made Atlcinta his home and had intended to 
continue to make it his home for an indefinite period of time. The 
lower court characterized Mr. Hungerford's intent to return to New 
York at some future time as "a mere hope or wish of an indefinite, 
or so-called floating nature," and held that the Hungerfords had 
abandoned whatever claim they had to a domicile in New York. Id. 
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at 528- This was the proposition for which the Commission 
originally cited the case and apparently was one of the bases for 
the Commission's holding that the O'Rourkes abandoned their 
domicile in Florida, since the Commission characterized the 
O'Rourkes' intent to return to Florida as "nothing more than mere 
hopes of some future expectation, the date and occurrence of which 
was unknown." Final" Decision at 7. 
On appeal, however, the Delaware Supreme Court 
specifically addressed the "floating intent" theory espoused by the 
lower court (and apparently relied upon by the Commission in 
rendering its Final Decision), and found the lower court's theory 
to be incorrect as a matter of law. The Delaware Supreme Court 
held that, notwithstanding Mr. Hungerford's substantial contacts in 
Georgia, a person's domicile, once established, remains the legal 
domicile of that person until a new domicile is acquired. To 
establish a new domicile, there must be a concurrence of an 
individual's physical presence at a place and the intention to make 
that place home. The absence of either element precludes a change 
in domicile: 
There must be an actual abandonment of this 
first domicile coupled with an intention not to 
return to it, and the acquisition of a new 
domicile by actual residence in another place 
with the intention of making that place a 
permanent home. Whether one has changed his 
domicile from one place to another must depend 
largely on his intention. The intention must be 
of permanent or indefinite living at a given 
place, not for mere temporary or special 
purposes, but with a present intention of making 
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that place home unless or until something 
uncertain or unexpected shall induce the 
adoption of some other permanent home; or, 
negatively expressed, there must be an absence 
of any present intention of not residing at the 
place permanently or for an indefinite time. It 
follows that absence from one's place of 
residence, even for a long time on business, 
pleasure or reasons of health, education of 
children or other special purpose, will not 
effect a change of domicile if, all the while, 
the person intends to be absent only for the 
accomplishment of a temporary purpose and to 
return to his former place of residence upon the 
fulfillment of the purpose. 
Id. at 783-84. 
In light of the similarity between the facts in the Riley 
case and the O'Rourkes' case, it is obvious why the Commission 
failed to acknowledge in its pleadings that the Riley case was 
reversed on appeal and apparently based its Final Decision on only 
the lower court opinion. Like Mr. Hungerford in the Riley case, 
the O'Rourkes have continually, and without exception, maintained 
that their presence in Utah was temporary and that they intended to 
return to Florida. As in Riley, the O'Rourkes' absence from their 
domicile in Florida was only for "the accomplishment of a temporary 
purpose" -- until they could acquire a home in Florida and return 
to that state. 
The rationale for finding that the O'Rourkes maintained 
their original domicile in Florida, however, is even more 
compelling than the factual basis for the Riley court's holding 
that Mr. Hungerford retained his original domicile. In contrast to 
the Riley case, the O'Rourkes owned and maintained extensive real 
property in Florida, and spent enormous sums there in an attempt to 
rehabilitate it to the point that the proceeds from its operations 
would finance the construction of their home there. Although 
inclement weather, unfavorable real estate markets, adverse 
employment factors and poor financial decisions continually forced 
the O'Rourkes to postpone their plans to return to Florida, the 
unrebutted evidence in this case is that the O'Rourkes' intent to 
return to Florida was fixed and permanent and that Utah was only a 
temporary location for Mrs. O'Rourke and the children. Tr. at 26, 
56-57; Ex. p. 17 at Response Nos. 3, 5 and 6. Unlike the Riley 
case, where the Hungerfords spent substantial sums to improve their 
real property in Georgia in order to make it more liveable, the 
uncontested evidence in this case is that the O'Rourkes made the 
improvements to the Olympus and Sandy houses primarily for the 
purpose of making them more marketable and to facilitate their 
return to Florida. See, Tr. at 25-26, 31-33. 
In contrast to the facts in Riley, during the periods in 
question, the entire O'Rourke family spent considerable time in 
Florida, Mr. O'Rourke was only infrequently in Utah, and the 
O'Rourkes maintained substantial and continuous contacts with 
Florida. See, Tr. at 56, 59, 102; Ex. p. 17 at Response Nos. 18, 
19, 24 and 26. The O'Rourkes obtained and maintained driver's 
licenses in Florida, opened and used bank accounts (including their 
main bank account, the Florida Account), registered their cars, 
voted, and paid taxes in Florida. Tr. at 57-59, 80; Ex. P-17 at 
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Response Nos. 16 and 24. Except where the O'Rourkes believed they 
were required by law to take those actions in Utah - - such as the 
O'Rourke's understanding that all nonoccasional users of Utah roads 
are required to obtain Utah driver's licenses and register their 
cars in the state -- they continued these actions in Florida after 
their arrival in Utah and during the entire period in question. 
See Tr. at 80-81. The O'Rourkes' actions throughout all of the 
periods in question were consistent with their expressed intent to 
maintain a domicile in Florida. 
Further, since the O'Rourkes7 intention to return to 
Florida was based upon the occurrence of an event which could be 
reasonably anticipated to occur, that intent cannot be deemed to be 
an "indeterminate" or "floating intent" requiring a finding that 
they abandoned their domicile in Florida. For example, when the 
O'Rourkes acquired the Eustis property, they were informed that the 
orange groves would generate substantial net income, which could 
then be used for the construction of the home on the Eustis 
property. Tr. at 19; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3. When they 
relocated to Utah and during the periods in question, it was 
reasonable for them to believe that the Eustis groves would 
generate sufficient income to provide for the construction of a 
home on the Eustis property and their return there. Only 
unanticipated and highly unlikely events (such as the unprecedented 
series of hard freezes in Florida, Mr. O'Rourke's brother's 
unexpected return to Utah, Mr. Lorenzo's acquisition of the control 
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of Eastern Airlines, Mr. O'Rourke's parents7 unexpected return to 
Florida and the sudden downturn in the Utah real estate market) 
prevented the O'Rourkes from returning to Florida. Indeed, each 
decision made by the O'Rourkes during the periods in question was 
designed to make their return to Florida a reality. The O'Rourkes 
invested substantial sums in their Eustis property for the specific 
purpose of generating income to build their home there. They 
bought the Lutz house to fix up and occupy when they were forced to 
sell their Eustis property. And, they bought and improved their 
Olympus house because they believed those actions would provide 
them with substantial returns they could use for the construction 
of their Florida house. See Gates v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 
199 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1952) (intention of taxpayer to return to 
original home when he has acquired sufficient business experience 
to manage a business is an intention based on an event which may be 
reasonably anticipated and is not a floating or indefinite 
intention; four year absence from original domicile); McDowell v. 
Friedmen Bros. Shoe Company, 115 S.W. 1028 (Mo. 1909) (family which 
gives up residence in one city and moves to another for two years 
with hope that warmer climate will be beneficial to daughter's 
health does not lose domicile in the first city, if in leaving and 
while remaining away, they have the intent of returning to first 
city when daughter's health improves). Accordingly, there was no 
basis for determining that the O'Rourkes had a floating or 
indefinite intent to return to Florida, and the Commission erred 
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when it determined that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in 
Florida and obtained a new domicile in Utah.7 
B. The Commission Did Not Show By Clear and Convincing 
Evidence That the O'Rourkes Abandoned Their Domicile in Florida. 
The courts have long recognized that a person's original domicile 
is favored over an alleged new domicile, and have generally held 
that the burden of production with respect to a change in domicile 
ultimately rests with the party asserting that change and that any 
such change must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. See, 
Elwert v. Elwert. 248 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1952); Valley National Bank of 
Phoenix v. Siebrand. 243 P.2d 771 (Ariz. 1952); Jizmeiian v. 
Jizmeiian, 492 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1972). See also, 36 A.L.R.2d 741; 
25 Am.Jur.2d Domicile § 86. In Paulsen v. Coombs, 254 P.2d 621, 
624 (Utah 1953), this Court defined "clear and convincing evidence" 
to be such evidence that there is "no serious nor substantial 
7Further, the O'Rourkes' situation can be easily distinguished 
from "indefinite intention" Ccises such as Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 
Inc. . 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). In Allen, this Court addressed 
domicile concepts in the context of a personal injury suit, and 
held that the plaintiff was not domiciled in Utah where she had 
physically moved to another state and had the intention of 
remaining there indefinitely. This Court indicated that, where a 
person is physically present in a location, the intent to remain 
there permanently need not be necessary to create a domicile in 
that place as long as the person intends to remain there 
indefinitely. The O'Rourkes, in contrast, although physically 
present in Utah, never had the intention of remaining in the state 
permanently or even indefinitely. Rather, based on the clear and 
unrebutted evidence, they at all times had the present intentionof 
remaining in Utah only for a specific and temporary period of time 
-- until they could build their home in Florida and return there. 
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doubt" regarding the proposition for which the proof is offered. 
This standard of proof is something more than the usual requirement 
of a preponderance of the evidence, but something less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt- Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 
1958). Accordingly, the Commission's holding that the O'Rourkes' 
domicile changed from Florida to Utah during the periods in 
question necessarily required the Commission to produce evidence 
sufficient in scope, nature and weight that no reasonable person 
reviewing the evidence would have any substantial doubt that the 
O'Rourkes did, in fact, abandon their domicile in Florida.8 
8At the Hearing, hearing officer Iwasaki noted that, as the 
petitioners in the case, the O'Rourkes had the "burden of proof". 
See Tr. at 6-7. See also, Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543; Tax 
Commission Rule R861-1-7A(G). Under general evidentiary law, 
however, the term "burden of proof" generally connotes two 
different concepts: (1) the burden of persuasion, which, under the 
traditional view, does not shift from one party to the other, and 
(2) the burden of going forward with the evidence, which may shift 
back and forth between the parties as the trial progresses. See, 
Exchange National Bank of Colorado Springs v. Sparkman, 554 P.2d 
1090 (Colo. 1976); Koesling v. Basanakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 
1975); Palicka v. Rath Fisher School District No. 90 of Meracopa 
County, 473 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1970); Bowen v. Hathaway, 446 P.2d 723 
(Kan. 1968). Once a party establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden of going forward with rebutting evidence then shifts to the 
other party. See, Palicka, supra. See also, Willinaham v. 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 377 F.Supp 1254 (D.C. 
S.D. Fla. 1974); Goodman v. Brock, 498 P.2d 676 (N.M. 1972). These 
concepts also apply in domicile cases. Messersmith v. Matteucci. 
276 F.Supp 310 (E.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd per curium 385 F.2d 1023 
(9th Cir. 1967). See Utah Code Ann. §59-10-543. Accordingly, upon 
a prima facie showing that the O'Rourkes were domiciled in Florida, 
the "burden of proof" -- in this case, the burden of production --
shifted to the Commission to establish at what point the O'Rourkes' 
domicile changed to Utah. As noted in the text, in overcoming the 
O'Rourkes' prima facie showing of a domicile in Florida, the 
Commission had to necessarily overcome the presumption that, once 
a domicile is established, it is presumed to continue until a 
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At the Hearing, the Commission produced absolutely no 
evidence that the O'Rourkes abandoned their domicile in Florida, 
and merely cross-examined Mr. O'Rourke about several matters he 
testified to in his direct examination. These matters included the 
O'Rourkes7 acquisition of real property in Utah, their improvements 
to that property, Mrs. O'Rourke's acquisition of a driver's license 
in Utah, the O'Rourkes' registration of some (but not all) of their 
automobiles in Utah and their voluntarily move to Utah from 
Florida. This was the sole evidence produced by the Commission, 
and it was not sufficient under the "clear and convincing" standard 
to show that the O'Rourkes abandoned their Florida domicile since 
any presumption of a change in domicile with respect to those 
matters was effectively rebutted by Mr. O'Rourke's other testimony 
regarding these same matters. 
The unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke established that 
the O'Rourkes registered their cars in Utah and that Mrs. O'Rourke 
obtained a license in the state only because the O'Rourkes believed 
that those actions were required by law of persons who used Utah 
roadways other than on an infrequent basis. Similarly, the 
O'Rourkes bought real property in Utah because they had to rollover 
their gain from the sale of their Miami house, and because they 
believed they could make a quick profit on the property, which they 
could use toward the construction of their Florida home. Tr. at 
change is clearly shown. See, Jizmeiian. at 1212. 
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25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 17. They made improvements to 
their real property in Utah in the hope that those improvements 
would make those properties more attractive to potential buyers and 
provide them with a greater return on their investment in the real 
property --a return which could be used towards construction of 
their home in Florida. Id. Any inference that the O'Rourkes took 
those actions because they considered Utah as their permanent place 
of abode is incorrect in light of the record. 
Finally, the Commission's reliance on the O'Rourkes' 
intentional move to Salt Lake as evidence of their abandonment of 
their Florida domicile is similarly misplaced, since it confuses 
free choice with an intent to remain permanently or indefinitely in 
a place. Under the Commission's rationale, a person's intentional 
choice to visit Disneyland, accompanied by his concurrent physical 
presence there, would change his domicile to the Magic Kingdom. 
This Court's holdings in cases such as Allen v. Greyhound Lines. 
Inc.. 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978), clearly require otherwise. 
C. The Commission Erred When It Determined That The 
Presence of Mrs. O'Rourke in Utah Constituted a Basis for 
Determining that the O'Rourkes were Domiciled in Utah. In its 
Final Decision, the Commission also based its decision on a finding 
that, because Mrs. O'Rourke and the O'Rourke children were 
physically present in Utah during the periods in question, Mr. 
O'Rourke's domicile was in Utah. See, Final Decision at pp. 7 and 
8. Any inference that Mr. O'Rourke was domiciled in Utah because 
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his family was temporarily here would be in conflict with 
established domiciliary law, which holds that a wife's domicile, as 
a matter of law, is determined by the domicile of her husband. 
Moreover, a wife's and children's physical presence in a particular 
place does not determine a husband's domicile if the husband has no 
intention of making that place the family's permanent home. See. 
e.g.. 28 C.J.S. Domicile at §§ 12 and 16(b) (wife's domicile is 
determined by domicile of husband as a matter of law; husband's 
domicile is determined by location of wife and children only if the 
family residence is a permanent home and not merely for transient 
purposes); Petition of Correa. 79 F.Supp. 265 (W.D. Tex. 1948) 
(man's residence may be where family resides if family resides at 
a place where they intend to stay permanently); Broadstone Realty 
Corp. v. Evans. 213 F.Supp. 261 (D.C. N.Y. 1962) aff'd 367 F.2d 397 
(2d. Cir. 1963) (man's residence may be where family resides, if 
that is at a home intended to be permanent) ; Glue v. Klein, 197 
N.W. 691 (wife's domicile determined by husband's); Bialac v. 
Bialac, 386 P.2d 852 (Ariz. 1963) (domicile of wife determined by 
domicile of husband); Small v. Small. 407 P.2d 491 (Kan. 1965) 
(wife's domicile is domicile of husband). In each case, the courts 
have emphasized that, even if a man's family is present in a place, 
the family does not relinquish its old domicile unless and until 
the husband has the actual intention of making the purportedly new 
domicile the family's permanent home. See also. Riley at 783-84. 
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In the instant case, the presence of Mr. O'Rourke's family 
in Utah was an indication that the O'Rourkes abandoned their 
domicile in Florida and obtained a new domicile in Utah if, and 
only if, the record clearly shows that Mr. O'Rourke had the actual 
intention of making Utah his family's permanent place of residence. 
The uncontroverted testimony offered at the Hearing and in the 
sworn responses to the interrogatories propounded by the Commission 
is directly to the contrary. The record clearly shows that (i) 
Mr. O'Rourke moved his family to Utah only for a temporary purpose; 
(ii) neither he nor Mrs. O'Rourke ever intended to make Utah their 
permanent home; and (iii) instead, they always intended to return 
to Florida upon the construction of their home there.9 See Tr. at 
26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 3. 
During the entire period that his family was physically 
present in Utah, Mr. O'Rourke maintained minimal contacts with 
Utah, but maintained extensive contacts with and in Florida. These 
contacts included all of the incidents of contact normally 
associated with a domicile, including the ownership of real 
property, the use and registration of an automobile, maintenance of 
9Further, if this Court finds that Mrs. O'Rourke and the 
O'Rourke children were residents of Utah during the periods in 
question, that still should not preclude a finding that Mr. 
O'Rourke was domiciled in Florida, since a husband and wife may 
have separate domiciles and may be residents of different states 
for tax purposes. See 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12(d) at 24-25 (wife 
may acquire domicile separate and apart from husband). See also, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-119 (1987) (recognizing the concept of 
husbands and wives with separate residences for tax purposes). 
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a driver's license, voter registration, and being physically 
present within the state for substantial periods of time. 
D. The Commission's Final Decision Is Not Supported By 
Substantial Evidence Based on the Whole Record. In Grace Drilling 
Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the 
Utah Court of Appeals stated that, when reviewing the decisions of 
administrative bodies to determine if a decision is supported by 
the evidence, this Court must consider and review the whole record 
before it and consider not only the evidence supporting the 
administrative body's findings, but also the evidence that detracts 
from the weight of the administrative body's evidence. Under this 
standard, there is no doubt that the Commission's determination 
that the O'Rourkes abandoned their Florida domicile is not 
supportable by the evidence. 
During the entire period in question, the O'Rourkes 
retained their intention to return to Florida. Their intention was 
fixed, certain and constant, and was evidenced by, and consistent 
with, their actions: They owned and maintained extensive real 
property in Florida; Mr. O'Rourke maintained voter registration in 
Florida; held a valid Florida driver's license throughout the 
entire period in question and belonged to sports clubs; they 
registered automobiles in the state; they maintained their primary 
banking accounts there; they paid property taxes in Florida; and 
they spent substantial time there. Their intent to return to 
Florida is further evidenced by the fact that they spent well over 
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$100,000 during the periods in question for the sole purpose of 
repairing and maintaining their orange groves on the Eustis 
property with the intent of rehabilitating the property and using 
the proceeds of its operations to construct a home there. 
Further, the unrebutted testimony of Mr. O'Rourke is that 
the O'Rourkes never had the intent to remain permanently or 
indefinitely in Utah: Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 
3, 5 and 6. Without the requisite intent, no amount of physical or 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a holding that the 
O'Rourkes acquired Utah as their domicile, even if the Commission 
had produced any. See Arizona Bd. of Regents v. Harper. 495 P.2d 
453 (Az. 1972) (must be concurrence of both actual physical 
presence in a location and an intention to remain there permanently 
or indefinitely); Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1978) (concurrence of physical presence ami intent to remain 
permanently or indefinitely required). The Commission had ample 
opportunity to challenge or discredit Mr. O'Rourke's testimony 
during the Hearing, but failed to do so. Therefore, it was an 
abuse of discretion for the Commission to ignore Mr. O'Rourke's 
sworn testimony and find that the O'Rourkes formed the requisite 
intent to become domiciled in Utah when the only evidence regarding 
intent was to the contrary. 
The Commission' -i decision is nlso in error since it 
resulted in the assessment of taxes against the O'Rourkes for all 
of the periods in question without any discussion or findings as to 
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when the O'Rourkes' domicile changed from Florida to Utah. See 85 
C.J.S. Taxation § 1092 (noting that only a resident is liable for 
taxes, and if a nonresident during any of periods for which 
assessment is sought, assessment is not proper). As noted above, 
in order for a domicile to be established, there must be a 
concurrence of physical presence and intent to remain in that place 
permanently or indefinitely. See. Allen and Arizona Bd. of 
Regents, supra. In order for the Commission to hold that the 
O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for tax purposes during all the 
periods in question, the Commission necessarily found that the 
O'Rourkes intended from the moment they entered Utah in 19 82 to 
remain here permanently or indefinitely. The evidence is clearly 
to the contrary, and the Commission offered absolutely no evidence 
which would establish when, or if, the O'Rourkes' intent changed so 
as to subject them to taxation. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING 
THE O'ROURKES WERE RESIDENTS FOR INCOME TAX 
PURPOSES DURING THE PERIODS IN QUESTION 
A. The Commission Erred in Not Addressing the Effects of 
Its Earlier Determination Regarding the O'Rourkes' Residency Status 
for Tax Purposes. At the Hearing, Mr. O'Rourke testified that, in 
September of 1988, the Commission notified him by letter of a 
proposed state income tax assessment for the year 1984. After 
receiving the letter, he met with Mr. Robert Laird, an income tax 
auditor for the Commission and provided him with proof that the 
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O'Rourkes were residents of Florida. At the conclusion of that 
meeting, Mr. Laird informed Mr. O'Rourke that, based on his review 
of the facts and the evidence submitted fay Mr. O'Rourke, the 
O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 1984. Mr. Laird further 
stated that if the O'Rourkes subsequently received any other 
letters from the Commission questioning their residency status, 
they should contact him again, and that he would make sure that the 
problem was promptly resolved in their favor. 
At the Hearing, Mr. Brent Barney, the income tax audit 
manager for the Commission, also gave testimony regarding Mr. 
O'Rourkes' 1988 meeting with the Commission. Mr. Barney testified 
that, among other things, he had reviewed Mr. Laird's actions at 
that meeting and had not reprimanded or admonished him for his 
actions, nor did he question his conclusions regarding the 
0'Rourkes' residency status. 
Despite the testimony regarding this issue at the Hearing, 
and without regard to the extensive arguments the O'Rourkes raised 
in their post-Hearing brief regarding the import of the 
Commission's 1988 actions, the Final Decision does not address, 
either factually or legally, the effects of the Commission's 1988 
determination. The Final Decision is completely silent on the 
issue. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the failure of a 
judicial body to make a finding on a material issue arising at 
trial constitutes reversible error, especially when the evidence 
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introduced as to that issue is sufficient to find in favor of the 
complaining party. See Romrel v. Zions First National Bank H.A., 
611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Boyer Co. v. Lignell. 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 
1977); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983); Duncan v. 
Hemmelwriaht. 186 P.2d 965 (Utah 1947). Since, as described in 
Section IIB, infra, the import of the Commission's actions in 1988 
was a material issue which was addressed extensively at the Hearing 
(and in the O'Rourkes' post-Hearing brief) and which, if held in 
the O'Rourkes' favor, precluded the Commission from assessing 
income taxes against the O'Rourkes for all or some of the periods 
in question, the Commission's failure to make any findings with 
respect to that issue constitutes reversible error. 
B. The Commission's 1988 Actions Precludes it From 
Claiming the O'Rourkes are Residents for Income Tax Purposes During 
the Periods in Question. As noted above, in September of 1988, Mr. 
O'Rourke met with Mr. Laird to discuss the specific issue of 
whether the O'Rourkes were residents of Utah for state income tax 
purposes. In conducting his investigation regarding the O'Rourkes' 
residency status, Mr. Laird was charged with the responsibility and 
authority to investigate all of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the O'Rourkes' residency status, and his review 
authority included the authority to examine all of their pertinent 
documents, books, papers, records, memoranda, and such other proof 
as he deemed proper in order to verify or establish if the 
O'Rourkes were Utah residents. See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-544 
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(1987) (describing general powers and duties of the Commission) . 
In exercise of this authority, and after such investigation as he 
believed was necessary under the circumstances, Mr. Laird concluded 
that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 1984. The 
Commission should be bound by this determination. 
Under the circumstances, Mr. Laird's actions constituted 
evidence of a'waiver"by the Commission of any assessment of taxes 
against the O'Rourkes for any of the periods in question. Since 
the meeting took place in late 1988, the Commission had 
constructive or actual notice of the O'Rourkes filing status foi 
the years 1982 through 1987.10 Mr. Laird's conclusion (which was 
based on such review of the facts as he deemed necessary under the 
circumstances) that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah in 
1984, and his assurances that they would not be deemed residents in 
any subsequent year, cons t i tu 1: ed an adiiii s s i on by the Commi s s ion 
that the O'Rourkes were not residents of Utah during any period in 
question. 
The Commission's admissi on that no cla im relatd ng to the 
O'Rourkes' residency status was warranted is further supported by 
Mr. Barney's testimony, which indicates that after Mr. Laird's 
meeting with Mr. O'Rourke, Mr. Barney reviewed Mr, Laird's actions 
10Mr. Barney, the Income Tax Audit Manager for the Commission, 
testified at the Hearing that the computer program which identified 
the O'Rourkes' return as "suspect" for the year 1984 also 
identified them as "suspect" for the years 1985, 1986, 1987 and 
1988. Tr. at 109. 
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and did not reprimand or otherwise admonish him for any action that 
he took at the meeting or for any violation of the Commission's 
regulations or internal procedures in handling the O'Rourkes' case. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Commission's actions in 
1988 was an admission only with respect to 1984, its findings that 
the O'Rourkes were not Utah residents in that year necessarily 
precludes a finding that they were residents for tax purposes in 
other years unless the Commission was able to show that there was 
a fundamental change in the O'Rourkes' circumstances during another 
tax year which required that their non-resident status be changed. 
The Commission introduced absolutely no evidence which would 
support such a finding, and any conclusion by the Commission to 
that effect would be without basis and an abuse of discretion. 
The concept of "finality" is one which is well recognized 
in equity and at law, and should be applied in this case. The 
ability of the Commission to continually reexamine cases its duly 
authorized agents have previously disposed of until it spots some 
avenue of attack must be subject to the same limitation. Judicial 
economy and fair play suggests nothing less. In light of Mr. 
Laird's express statements to Mr. O'Rourke at the meeting in 1988, 
and in light of the Commission's broad power to conduct further 
investigations at that time into the O'Rourkes' residency status if 
there had been any question as to that status, the Commission 
should be bound by its prior determination and be barred from 
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assessing any taxes, penalties or interest against the O'Rourkes 
for the periods in question.11 
Finally, based on Mr. Laird's representations at the 1988 
meeting, the O'Rourkes understood that the Commission did not 
dispute that they were residents of Florida. If Mr. Laird had 
questioned the O'Rourkes' residency status for tax purposes at that 
time, the O'Rourkes "could have filed i: eturns for the periods in 
question and then sought a refund for the taxes paid if they wished 
to pursue the residency issue. Instead, and in reliance on the 
Commission's representations, the O'Rourkes did not file their 
returns and the Commission is now seeking penalties and increased 
interest for those periods. Because the O'Rourkes reasonably 
relied to their detriment upon the statements of the Commission, 
even if they were to be deemed to be residents of Utah for the 
periods in question, the Commission should n^ w be estopped from 
assessing penalties or interest for those periods. 
"Unlike under federal tax law, no Commission rules or 
regulations directly address the effect of the Commission's 1988 
actions in this case. Under the Internal Revenue Code regulations, 
however, when a preliminary examination of a return results in 
questions, a personal interview is scheduled. If the taxpayer 
furnishes sufficient explanation and the audit officer does not 
believe that further factual investigation is required, the case is 
deemed closed. See generally. Treas. Reg. § 601.105. Once a case 
is closed, it may be reopened to make an adjustment unfavorable to 
the taxpayer only under special circumstances, none of which are 
present in this case. See Treas. Reg. § 601.105(j). These 
regulations give voice and substance to the salutary policy of 
finality and recognize the established rule that administrative 
bodies should be prohibited from continually reviewing their own 
decisions and revoking actions once duly taken by them. See 73A 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure, § 155, note 46. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the 
Final Decision of .e Commission. 
DATED this day of August, 1991. 
HAN^EN\ JONES & LETA 
SoQtt R. NSa#jpenter 
Stephen R. Cochell 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
JAMES AND BEVERLY O'ROURKE, ) 
Petitioners, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
V. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 90-0038 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
) 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on January 14, 1991. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioners were 
Steven Cochell and Scott Carpenter, Attorneys at Law. Present 
and representing the Respondent was Mark Wainwright, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is income tax. 
2. The audit periods in question are 1983 through 
1988. 
3. The Petitioners are husband and wife who, for the 
audit periods in question, filed joint federal income tax 
returns. The husband, James O'Rourke (hereinafter singularly 
referred to as HPetitioneru), worked as an airline pilot for 
Eastern Airlines. The wife, Beverly O'Rourke, was not employed 
during the audit periods in question. 
4. As a pilot, the Petitioner would fly into and out 
of a "home base'1 city. Specifically, the airline which the 
Petitioner flew for had six major bases in cities located 
primarily in the eastern part of the United States. All trips, 
or sequences, which the pilots were assigned to fly originated 
from and finished at the home base to which the pilot was 
assigned. 
5. For 1982 through April 1983, the Petitioner's 
home base was New York. From April 1983 through December 1984, 
the Petitioner's home base was Houston. After December 1984, 
the Petitioner's home base was Atlanta and remained so until 
his retirement from the airline. 
6. When assigned to each of the home bases, the 
Petitioner would make living arrangements during his stay in 
those home bases. Typically, the Petitioner would rent an 
apartment in the home base city and commute to his family on 
those days he was not working. 
7. Prior to August 1982, the Petitioner and his 
family resided in Miami, Florida. In the latter part of 1980, 
the Petitioners decided that Miami was no longer a suitable 
place in which to raise their family, so they began to make 
plans to relocate. 
8. In furtherance of those plans, the Petitioners 
purchased 32 acres of orange grove property in Eustis, 
Florida. It was their intention to build a home on part of the 
land and raise oranges on the remaining acreage. The 
Petitioners had expected the profits received from the sale of 
oranges to finance the construction of the home. That purchase 
occurred in December 1980. 
9. Approximately one week after purchasing the 
orange grove, the Eustis area suffered a freeze which destroyed 
the orange crop and damaged some of the trees. As a result, 
the Petitioners did not realize any income from the orange crop 
for 1981. The Petitioners, therefore, were unable to begin 
construction on their home during that period of time. 
10. In May 1981, the Petitioners purchased an 
additional eight acres of property located adjacent to the 
orange grove. The purpose of that acreage purchase was to 
provide land upon which the Petitioners could build a home for 
Mr. O'Rourke's parents. Included in that eight acres was 
approximately four acres of orange trees. 
11. During 1982, although the Petitioners were unable 
to begin construction of their home in Eustis, the Petitioners 
still desired to move out of the Miami area. They, therefore, 
began looking for suitable homes in other parts of Florida; 
however, could not find anything which they felt to be suitable 
which was in their affordable price range of approximately 
$140,000. 
12. Having found no suitable homes in the Florida 
area, the Petitioners expcinded their search and ultimately 
decided to purchase a home in the Olympus Cove area of Salt 
Lake City. In August 1982, the Petitioners purchased said home 
for $125,000. The Petitioners made a down payment on that home 
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of $45,000. That money was obtained from a portion of the 
profit realized when the Petitioners sold their home in Miami, 
13. Within a few months of purchasing the Salt Lake 
City home, the Petitioners began to remodel it. During the 
first few months they were in the Salt Lake City home, they 
expended approximately $10,000 in improvements to the kitchen 
and bathroom areas of that home. During the Petitioners stay 
in that home from 1982 until its sale in 1989, the Petitioners 
made improvements to the home in the amount of approximately 
$35,000. 
14. In 1982, the Petitioner's parents, at the 
suggestion of the Petitioner, moved into an unoccupied house in 
Salt Lake City which was owned by the Petitioner's brother. 
The plan being that when the brother returned to reoccupy the 
house in 1984, after having fulfilled his contractual 
obligations with his employer, the Petitioner would then be in 
a position to build the parents a house on the Eustis property. 
15. The brother's return to Salt Lake City occurred 
in April 1983, substantially earlier than had been 
anticipated. The Petitioner, having felt some obligation to 
his parents, refinanced his home in Salt Lake City and obtained 
enough money to make a down payment on a home which he 
purchased in Sandy, Utah, for his parents to live in. The 
parents occupied that house from April 1983 until August 1987, 
at which time they returned to Florida. Thereafter, and until 
1990, the Petitioner maintained possession of the house until 
its sale in 1990. 
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16. In 1983, the Petitioners1 orange grove suffered 
again from a freeze, which led to no income being produced from 
that orange grove. In 1984, a freeze again occurred which 
destroyed every orange tree on the property. 
17. Because of the Petitioner's financial situation, 
he was forced to sell the Eustis property and did so in 1987. 
Under the terms of that sale contract, the Petitioners received 
some money in 1987 and 1988, and the balance of the sale price 
in 1989. 
18. During the audit periods in question, the 
Petitioner had three home bases from which he flew. Those 
were: (1) New York City, New York; (2) Houston, Texas; and (3) 
Atlanta, Georgia. When not in his home base, and on his days 
off, the Petitioner would commute to his home and family in 
Salt Lake City, or would visit other cities for various 
personal reasons. Petitioner also would visit Florida to check 
on his property there. The ability to fly free as a benefit of 
his employment with the airline, made such travel possible for 
the Petitioner. 
19. During the audit periods, the Petitioner paid no 
income tax to any state, including those states which 
constituted his home base. 
20. In November 1988, the Petitioner retired from the 
airline. The Petitioner currently resides in Tacoma, 
Washington, where he is employed by an aircraft manufacturer. 
21. The Petitioner testified that during the entire 
audit period, it was always his intention to return to Florida 
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to live as soon as he was in a position where he could afford 
to do so. 
22. The Petitioner owned several cars during the 
audit period. A number of those vehicles were registered to 
the Petitioner in Utah. The Petitioner also owned a vehicle 
which was registered to him in the state of Florida. That 
vehicle was the vehicle which the Petitioner took with him to 
each of his home bases and used for transportation while in 
those home bases. Mr. O'Rourke possessed a Florida drivers 
license during the audit periods. Mrs. O'Rourke obtained a 
Utah driver license in 1982, which she maintained through 1988. 
23. The Petitioner did not spend an aggregate of 183 
or more days in any of the years of the audit periods. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A "resident individual" for Utah income tax purposes, 
who is then subject to the imposition of an income tax, means 
an individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of 
time during the taxable year, but only for the duration of such 
period, or an individual who is not domiciled in the state but 
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and spends 
an aggregate of 183 or more days of the taxable year in the 
state. (Utah Code Ann. S59-10-103(l)(j).) 
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has a 
true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to 
which place he has (whenever he is absent) the intention of 
returning. It is the place in which a person has voluntarily 
fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere 
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special or temporary purpose, but with the present intention of 
making a permanent home. (Utah State Tax Commission 
Administrative Rule R865-9-2i(D).) 
DECISION AND ORDER 
In the present case, the singular issue to be decided 
by the Commission is whether or not the Petitioner was a 
"resident" for Utah income tax purposes as defined under Utah 
State statute and Utah State Tax Commission Administrative 
Rules. 
It is the Petitioner's position that the Petitioner 
never intended to abandon his domicile in Florida, nor did he 
ever intend to establish a domicile in Utah. The Petitioner 
testified that it was always his intention to construct a home 
on the Eustis property and live in Florida permanently. 
While the Petitioner may indeed have had some 
intention or hope of someday returning to Florida, such 
intentions were nothing more than mere hopes of some future 
expectation, the date of the occurrence of which was unknown. 
On the other hand, the evidence clearly established that the 
Petitioner voluntarily disposed of his place of habitation in 
Florida and voluntarily moved himself and his family to Utah, 
where he acquired a new place of habitation. 
The fact that the Petitioner may have considered his 
Salt Lake City residence to be his place of residence only 
until he was financially able to relocate back to Florida, does 
not require a finding that the Salt Lake residence was not his 
true, fixed, nor permanent home and principle establishment 
until he was someday able to return to Florida. Under those 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the Salt Lake residence 
was a place of habitation for a special or a temporary 
purpose. There having been no definite, or even foreseen 
period when the Petitioners would have moved back to Florida, 
the Salt Lake home was the Petitioners* permanent home. 
Under the Administrative Rule defining domicile, the 
evidence has established that the Petitioner's Salt Lake 
residence was the place where his true, fixed, and permanent 
home rested, and was also the place to which he had the 
intention of returning whenever he was absent. The evidence 
further established that such could not have been the case with 
any place in Florida since the Petitioner had no residence in 
Florida to either be absent from nor to return to. 
The facts also clearly support a finding that the 
Petitioner not only abandoned his old domicile in Florida by 
voluntarily and intentionally selling his residence there and 
relocating to Utah, but also establishes that he intended to 
establish a new domicile in Utah. 
The Petitioner would argue that he never intended to 
make Utah his permanent place of residence. While the 
Petitioner may have always entertained a hope of returning to 
Florida, his actions in Utah sufficiently demonstrate his 
intention to make Utah his domicile while here. In support of 
that finding are the facts that he purchased a home in Utah, 
and then expended a significant amount of money in improving 
that home; he moved his wife and children with him to Utah, and 
while here, his children attended Utah schools; he purchased a 
second home in Utah into which his parents moved; his 
automobiles were registered in Utah; and, that it was his Utah 
home to which he returned whenever absent from it. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that the Petitioners were resident individuals of Utah for 
income tax purposes and thus responsible for filing and paying 
Utah income tax returns. Therefore, the determination of the 
Auditing Division is affirmed. It is so ordered. 
DATED this Z day of Qrtju 0 1991. 
BY^eSDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
ABSENT 
[.' Hansen Roger 0. Tew 
Chairman ^ "7 ^ Commissi 
>e B. Pacheco 
"Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
PFI/sd/1138w / ^ coy* 
{.(SEAL) 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
James & Beverly O'Rourke 
c/o Hansen Jones & Leta 
Valley Tower Building, Sixth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Brent Barney 
Auditing Division 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Mark Wainwright 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James H. Rogers 
Director, Auditing Div. 
Heber M. Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
DATED this ^ day of (lfl/u'9 
Secretary 
o.wu 
1991 
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